

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03

SS-20 USIA-15 IO-14 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04

OMB-01 AEC-11 DRC-01 /164 W

----- 113602

P R 131523Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 558

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T VIENNA 9378

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: ANALYSIS OF WARSAW PACT

PROPOSAL

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF AN ANALYSIS OF THE WARSAW
PACT REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL, DRAFTED AND APPROVED BY THE AD HOC
GROUP. THE ANALYSIS WILL BE SENT BY CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF AD
HOC GROUP TO THE NAC AS A COLLECTIVE REPORT.

BEGIN TEXT:

SUBJECT: WARSAW PACT REDUCTION PROPOSAL OF 8 NOVEMBER
ANALYSIS BY THE AD HOC GROUP

1. PURPOSE

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1. THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL APPEARS DESIGNED TO SERVE A VARIETY
OF PURPOSES:

A. TO CAPTURE THE INITIATIVE GAINED BY THE ALLIES
WITH THEIR DETAILED OPENING STATEMENTS AND SUBSEQUENT

PRESENTATION OF THEMES;

B. MORE BROADLY, TO SHIFT THE BASIS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FROM WESTERN TO SOVIET GROUND, AND TO TRY TO OBLIGE THE ALLIES TO NEGOTIATE FROM SOVIET RATHER THAN WESTERN CONCEPTS;

C. TO COUNTER THE MAIN WESTERN LINES OF ARGUMENT, WITHOUT BEING DRAWN INTO A REASONED DIALOGUE ON AWKWARD ISSUES SUCH AS DISPARITIES AND DATA;

D. TO DISLOCATE THE ORDERLY PRESENTATION OF THE WESTERN CASE, AND PERHAPS TO GENERATE DISCORD ON THE WESTERN SIDE ABOUT HOW TO RESPOND;

E. TO MAKE AN ADVANTAGEOUS IMPACT ON WESTERN PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY OPINION, BY PRESENTING A SEEMINGLY SIMPLE AND SUPERFICIALLY ATTRACTIVE SOLUTION. (ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY IMMEDIATE SOVIET INTENTION TO LEAK THEIR PROPOSAL TO THE PRESS, THEY NO DOUBT EXPECT IT TO BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE SOONER OR LATER).

2. WE CANNOT AT THIS STAGE DETERMINE WHICH OF THESE PURPOSES THE EAST REGARDS AS BEING OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE.

POINTS OF DIFFERENCE FROM THE NATO APPROACH

1. THE EAST PROCEEDS FROM THE EXISTING FORCE RELATIONSHIP WHICH IT CLAIMS THAT HISTORY HAS PROVED TO BE ADEQUATE, AND MAINTAINS THAT THIS SHOULD NOT BE ALTERED AS A RESULT OF REDUCTIONS. IT DELIBERATELY IGNORES DISPARITIES AND EMPHASISES THE NEED FOR EQUIVALENT REDUCTIONS ON EITHER SIDE.

2. IN A FIRST, SYMBOLIC STAGE IT IS PROPOSED THAT THERE SHOULD BE EQUAL QUANTITATIVE REDUCTIONS (20,000). IN TWO SUBSEQUENT, MORE SUBSTANTIVE STAGES THERE WOULD BE EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS (5 PERCENT PLUS 10 PERCENT), APPLIED TO

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ALL FORCES OF EACH NATIONALITY. (ARTICLES 1-2 OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT). THERE IS NO PROVISION FOR PHASES OF NEGOTIATION. THE PROPOSED STATES IN WHICH REDUCTIONS WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED, WOULD BE NEGOTIATED SIMULTANEOUSLY AS PARTS OF A SINGLE AGREEMENT.

3. NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE REDUCTIONS IN ALL STAGES (ARTICLE 2). IN HIS STATEMENT, KHlestov SAID THAT REDUCTIONS SHOULD APPLY TO THE ENTIRE COMPLEX OF FORCES IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA, AND ARGUED AGAINST LIMITING REDUCTIONS ONLY TO SPECIFIC COMPONENTS OF THOSE FORCES, EXPLICITLY ON THE GROUND THAT THIS WOULD DISTURB THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES.

4. THERE IS NO MENTION OF "ASSOCIATED MEASURES". IN CONTRAST TO HIS OPENING STATEMENT, KHLESTOV IN HIS COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT PROPOSAL RESTRICTS THE "AGREED SUBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS" TO THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.

5. NEITHER VERIFICATION NOR NON CIRCUMVENTION IS MENTIONED IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT. A SINGLE SENTENCE IN KHLESTOV'S STATEMENT SAYS THAT VERIFICATION CAN BE ENSURED BY NATIONAL MEANS.

6. FOR THE INITIAL REDUCTION OF 20,000 MEN, THE MIX OF NATIONALITIES IS NOT DEFINED AND IS APPARENTLY LEFT TO BE DETERMINED IN A PROTOCOL TO BE NEGOTIATED. IN THE SUBSEQUENT PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS ALL "NATIONAL AND FOREIGN FORCES" ARE TO BE REDUCED CONCURRENTLY BY THE SAME PERCENTAGES (ARTICLE 2).

7. REDUCTIONS ARE TO BE BY THE SAME KIND OF UNITS ON EACH SIDE (ARTICLE 3).

8. FOREIGN FORCES OF BOTH SIDES MUST REMOVE ALL THEIR EQUIPMENT UPON WITHDRAWAL TO WITHIN THEIR NATIONAL BORDERS (ARTICLE 4).

9. THE PROPOSED RESTRICTION ON THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW MANPOWER, ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT TO "ROUTINE REPLACEMENT" (ARTICLE 6), TOGETHER WITH THE PROVISION
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FOR REDUCTIONS BY UNITS IN ALL TYPES AND NATIONALITIES OF FORCES, WOULD RESULT IN A MULTIPLICITY OF SUBCEILINGS, THEREBY VIRTUALLY PRECLUDING NATO FORCE IMPROVEMENT IN THE AREA.

10. THE REQUIREMENTS THAT NATIONAL FORCES INCLUDED IN THE REDUCTIONS SHALL BE DISBANDED (ARTICLE 5), AND THAT BOTH NATIONAL AND FOREIGN FORCES SHALL THEREAFTER BE SUBJECT TO SEPARATE CEILINGS (ARTICLE 6), SEEM DESIGNED INTER ALIA TO INHIBIT FUTURE EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION. THE EXPLICITY INCLUSION OF A PROHIBITION (ARTICLE 8) ON THE FUTURE ASSUMPTION OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT COULD SERVE THE SAME PURPOSE.

111 EVALUATION

1. AS CAN BE SEEN FROM THE FOREGOING ANALYSIS, THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE EASTERN APPROACH CONFLICT WITH THOSE OF THE WEST ON ALMOST ALL POINTS. THIS WAS ALREADY APPARENT FROM THE TERMS OF BREZHNEV'S SPEECH OF 26 OCTOBER. NEVERTHELESS THERE ARE FEATURES OF THE EASTERN

PROPOSAL WHICH ARE NOT WHOLLY NEGATIVE. THE MANNER IN WHICH IT HAS BEEN PRESENTED, AND THE AMOUNT OF SUBSTANCE IT CONTAINS, APPEAR TO REFLECT EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN SOME SERIOUS NEGOTIATION, EVEN THOUGH THERE IS AS YET NO HINT OF A GENUINE DIALOGUE WITH THE WEST ON THOSE ASPECTS OF FORCE REDUCTIONS WHICH ARE OF MOST CONCERN TO US.

EVEN AS AN OPENING BID, THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL IS LESS EXTREME THAN IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN. FOR EXAMPLE THE REDUCTIONS PROPOSED - BETWEEN 16 PERCENT AND 17 PERCENT - ARE CONSIDERABLY SMALLER THAN IN EARLIER SOVIET PROPOSALS IN THE FIFTIES FOR ONE-THIRD CUTS. (NEVERTHELESS, THE SCALE OF WESTERN REDUCTIONS PROPOSED EXCEEDS THAT ACCEPTABLE TO NATO.)

2. PARTICULAR POINTS OF SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE EASTERN AND WESTERN APPROACHES ARE DIFFICULT TO FIND, BUT IT IS PERHAPS SIGNIFICANT THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL PROVIDES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS IN SUCCESSIVE STAGES. THE

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DRAFT AGREEMENT DOES NOT EXPLICITLY PRECLUDE THE REDUCTION OF ONLY US AND SOVIET FORCES IN THE PROPOSED FIRST STAGE, ALTHOUGH THE LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE 2 IS WEIGHTED IN THE DIRECTION OF SOME FIRST STAGE REDUCTIONS BY ALL THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE EASTERN PROPOSALS DOES NOT DISCRIMINATE EXPLICITLY AGAINST THE BUNDESWEHR OR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY; THE PROPOSAL WOULD, HOWEVER, REQUIRE THAT THE LARGEST REDUCTIONS ON THE WESTERN SIDE BE IN THE BUNDESWEHR, AND THAT THESE WOULD BE IN THE FORM OF DISBANDMENT.

3. THE SCOPE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE DRAFT AGREEMENT AS DEFINED BY THE EAST AT THIS STAGE IS FIRMLY LIMITED TO CENTRAL EUROPE. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL EXPLICITLY LISTS (ARTICLE 1) THE COUNTRIES OF THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA AS THE REDUCTIONS AREA (ALTHOUGH HUNGARY IS FIRMLY EXCLUDED). AS REGARDS THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON THE SECURITY OF STATES OTHER THAN THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, NO DISTINCTION IS MADE BY THE EAST BETWEEN SPECIAL STATUS PARTICIPANTS AND NON-PARTICIPANTS.

4. THE EAST MAKES NO DEMANDS FOR FRENCH PARTICIPATION, NOR ARE ITS PROPOSALS FRAMED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO REQUIRE FRENCH FORCES TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN CALCULATING THE EXTENT OF THE REDUCTIONS TO BE MADE ON THE WESTERN SIDE. FRENCH FORCES IN GERMANY WOULD, HOWEVER, COME WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 6, WHICH WOULD OBLIGE THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY TO PREVENT ANY INCREASE AT ALL OF FOREIGN OR NATIONAL FORCES ON ITS TERRITORY.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: X
Capture Date: 12 MAY 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: AGREEMENT DRAFT, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 13 NOV 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: mcintyresh
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973VIENNA09378
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731168/abqcelng.tel
Line Count: 221
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: mcintyresh
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 13 JUL 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <13-Jul-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <20-Aug-2001 by mcintyresh>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: ANALYSIS OF WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
NATO INFO BONN
LONDON
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005